

# Does Limited Investor Attention Explain Mutual Fund Flows? Evidence from Sector Funds\*

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September 20, 2017

## Abstract

We argue that investors appear to utilize the CAPM to evaluate fund managers because investors exhibit limited attention. Funds provide information on market returns, which are plausible performance benchmarks. Investors employing these benchmarks appear to believe the CAPM. Sector funds are an ideal setting to disentangle limited attention from true belief in the CAPM: investors are provided sector benchmark returns as well as market returns. Though sector returns are not risk factors, we show that investors respond to this information when assessing managers. To improve investors allocation decisions, funds should provide investors with returns for plausible benchmarks and risk factors.

**JEL Classification:** G11, G12, D83.

**Keywords:** limited attention, mutual funds, sector funds, fund flows, investor behavior.

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\*We thank Sandro Andrade, Stefanos Delikouras, Chotibhak Jotikasthira, Veronika Pool, Clemens Sialm, Matt Spiegel, Sheridan Titman, and seminar participants at the University of Miami, University of Texas at Dallas, and Stockholm Business School for helpful comments and suggestions. William Bazley and Sarah Khalaf provided excellent research assistance. Indraneel Chakraborty: University of Miami. Alok Kumar: University of Miami. Tobias Mühlhofer: University of Miami. Ravi Sastry: University of Melbourne, Australia. Corresponding Author: Alok Kumar; School of Business Administration, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124; email: akumar@miami.edu; Tel: (305)284-1882; Fax: (305)284-6526.

Paying attention is costly (Kahneman, 1973). Does limited attention hinder investors from correctly evaluating fund managers' skill? If so, how can we design policies to help investors make better decisions? This paper explores the importance of limited investor attention (see Hirshleifer, 2001; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Barber and Odean, 2008; Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2009; Stango and Zinman, 2014, among others), on mutual fund investment decisions.

This question has gained renewed importance because of the striking findings in two recent influential papers (Barber, Huang, and Odean, 2016; Berk and van Binsbergen, 2016): aggregate investor behavior, as revealed by mutual fund flow data, is best explained by the CAPM. Although this is preferable to some alternatives — e.g., raw-return chasing or simple market adjustment — investors appear to be disregarding much of the consensus regarding fund performance evaluation. Barber, Huang, and Odean (2016) conclude that a lack of investor sophistication is driving their result. These findings raise a puzzle. Investors are not completely unsophisticated, as implementing the CAPM requires computation of market betas; but why does their sophistication end at the CAPM?

To understand this aspect of investor behavior, we investigate which dimension of sophistication is lacking. In particular, investors may (A) prefer CAPM, or (B) accept multifactor models in principle but utilize the CAPM in practice due to limited attention to additional factors. We use “unsophisticated” to refer to the investors in hypothesis (A). We use “underattentive” to refer to the investors in hypothesis (B).

These hypotheses have radically different policy implications. If investors are unsophisticated, then financial education, additional regulation of mutual funds, or stronger fiduciary laws may lead to improved retail investor welfare. However, if investors are (merely) underattentive, then all that is necessary is improved access or attention to important information. This could be provided either voluntarily, or by mandate, by fund companies to investors.

Disentangling hypotheses (A) and (B) is non-trivial and, we argue, not possible in the space of general equity mutual funds frequently analyzed in the literature. Distinguishing true belief in the CAPM from reliance on readily available information is confounded in general settings, since broad market indices (such as the S&P 500) are a good proxy for the market factor in the CAPM and are also the most common fund benchmarks.<sup>1</sup> Prior work has established that investors respond to style category returns (Teo and Woo, 2004), benchmark adjusted fund returns (Sensoy, 2009), and style category adjusted fund returns (Barber, Huang, and Odean, 2016).<sup>2</sup> However, as long as these style categories and benchmarks are proxies for the Fama French pricing factors, we are unable to discriminate between sophisticated investors (who accept multifactor models and use them) and attentive investors (who use whatever factor/benchmark information is readily available to them). In the general equity fund setting, these investors are observationally equivalent. Further, prior research has not addressed our main question: why do fund investors appear to utilize the CAPM to allocate capital?

Sector funds provide an ideal setting to answer our question — in terms of the information set readily available to investors — providing for a clean out-of-sample test on a relatively large dataset.<sup>3</sup> In addition to a broad market benchmark, investors in these funds are also provided information regarding a sector benchmark that has low correlation with both the overall market and additional risk factors.<sup>4,5</sup> Crucially, there is no sense in which the sector benchmark, despite its salience, can be considered a priced

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<sup>1</sup>See Table I in Cremers, Petajisto, and Zitzewitz (2012) for a comprehensive summary of mutual fund benchmarks.

<sup>2</sup>In addition to various return types, research has also shown that fund investors respond to and ignore some other fund characteristics (see, for example, Barber, Odean, and Zheng, 2005).

<sup>3</sup>Sector funds comprise 10–15% of total assets under management in the U.S. mutual fund industry.

<sup>4</sup>See Figure 2, which shows performance and benchmark information for a sector fund, in comparison to Figure 1. We are not arguing that investors look only, or even primarily, at funds' prospectuses for their information. We are arguing that information regarding a sector benchmark is readily available to sector fund investors; the prospectus is merely a proxy that demonstrates availability. Sophisticated investors, who by definition are informed, can always obtain returns data for pricing factors and relevant benchmarks.

<sup>5</sup>Table I reports the correlation between monthly value weighted sector returns in our sample with monthly returns of the market index.

risk factor. Regardless of whether investors believe in the CAPM or a multifactor model, they should not respond to this placebo.<sup>6</sup> This is the null hypothesis that we reject, suggesting that readily available, plausibly relevant information will be used by investors, consistent with hypothesis (B).

Thus, to explain the puzzling findings, we argue that investors appear to utilize the CAPM in the general equity fund setting because they exhibit limited attention. When funds provide them with broad market benchmark returns, investors take the (possibly unintended) cue and use that information to evaluate fund managers. Our results show that investors use sector benchmark returns when they are provided, even though they are not risk factors, and therefore, should not be used. We argue that the reason investors do so is because it is salient, plausibly relevant information. Hence, to improve the skill evaluation and capital allocation process, a policy suggestion would be to provide investors with returns for plausible benchmarks and risk factors.

Our empirical approach uses a fund-level monthly panel dataset of fund flows in U.S. sector funds from 1998–2009. We test whether a model that includes sector benchmark information is *better* than the CAPM in explaining fund flows. To identify which asset pricing model performs best in terms of modeling investor behavior, we measure abnormal fund returns (alpha) for two competing models, and assess which of the two measures better explains subsequent fund flows. One approach is that of Berk and van Binsbergen (2016), who focus on the relationship between the *sign* of estimated alphas and the *sign* of subsequent flows. Another is that of Barber, Huang, and Odean (2016), who project the *actual* flows onto indicators representing the *decile rank* of estimated alphas. While both approaches are robust to nonlinearities in the flow-performance relationship, the former paper’s approach — by virtue of considering only the sign of fund flows — is also robust to aggregation across funds. In contrast, the latter paper’s spec-

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<sup>6</sup>This assumes that the sector benchmark is not correlated with any omitted factors, conditional on covariance with the market. Given the robustness of our findings across nearly (conditionally) uncorrelated sectors, this assumption is justified.

ification assumes that a single (nonlinear) flow-performance relationship holds across all funds. Under this assumption, their test is more efficient statistically. Thus, the two approaches come with a tradeoff between robustness and efficiency. Given that we have sufficient statistical power in our dataset of sector funds, the scale tips towards robustness. In a third, hybrid test of the two competing models, we build upon the strengths of both existing specifications. These are the main tests, but sections III and IV report on some additional tests. In each case, we find results in support of limited attention hypothesis: fund flows are better explained by the sector benchmark model than by the CAPM.

Our results show that investors use sector benchmark returns along with market returns to determine whether managers outperformed in a specific period, and this model explains fund flows better than the null that the investors are using the CAPM to assess managers. These results obtain in the presence of fund-specific fixed effects, suggesting that differences in fund specific investor priors, or posteriors, or other persistent differences such as how the funds are marketed (Del Guercio and Reuter, 2014) are not driving the results. We control for fund size in every period along with fund fixed effects, suggesting that differences in skill and returns to scale of managers (Berk and Green, 2004; Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015) do not explain away the results. Inclusion of time fixed effects addresses concerns that aggregate economic characteristics or high investor sentiments in certain periods (Chiu and Kini, 2014) are driving the results. The empirical approach is applicable to models which may be behavioral in nature. In our case, we argue that investors suffering from limited attention respond to sector benchmarks *because* the information is provided, even though such benchmark returns are not (proxies for) priced risk factors. We are essentially arguing that information availability leads to investor usage, conditional on plausible relevance.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Thus, we do not claim that investors will respond to whatever information is included in fund prospectuses or other materials, however irrelevant. We can not directly test whether investors ignore obviously irrelevant information, as such information is not routinely provided.

Our findings are consistent with the literature on limited investor attention and processing power (see Hirshleifer, 2001; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003, among others). Barber and Odean (2008) show that investors respond to information that easily attracts their attention, allowing them to manage the problem of choosing among thousands of possible stock purchases (Odean, 1999). Huberman and Regev (2001) show that investors may pay attention to even stale news if it is reported prominently. At the same time response to other information that is also important but harder to process is delayed (DellaVigna and Pollet (2009); Cohen and Frazzini (2008); Cohen and Lou (2012), suggesting investor information processing constraints. Investor inattention maybe rational (Sims, 2003, 2006; Stokey, 2009). In the context of capital markets, Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2013) shows that in the presence of costs to obtain information, a consumer will remain optimally inattentive to the stock market for finite intervals of time.<sup>8</sup> While the literature has argued in favor of optimal inattention over *time* and over *stocks*, we are arguing that retail investors exhibit limited attention over the *space of benchmarks*, and utilize the ones that are readily available and plausibly relevant in their decision-making process.<sup>9</sup>

Our work also relates to the well established literature on the determinants of flow decisions of mutual fund investors. On the impact of brokerages and fund fees, Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2005) find that when choosing funds, investors pay attention to salient fees such as loads, but not to hidden fees. Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) investigate whether mutual fund brokers help mutual fund investors improve allocation, but do not find evidence of such tangible benefits. Christoffersen, Evans, and Musto (2013) find that brokers' incentives have significant effects on mutual funds' flows. Regarding behavioral biases at the investor level, Kumar (2009) finds that stock

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<sup>8</sup>Thus, if the cost of information acquisition and processing is not taken into account, it would appear that the standard inter-temporal Euler equation that relates asset returns and consumption growth does not hold (Lynch, 1996).

<sup>9</sup>The literature has also identified search costs over the space of mutual funds as a determinant of fund flows (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Beyond mutual funds, for assets in general, Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) show that information acquisition costs can rationalize under-diversification.

categorization influences investors' allocation decisions. Froot and Teo (2008) find that institutional investors also have style preferences. Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2011) find that investors who do not pay attention to news trade mutual funds frequently, buy higher expense funds, prefer active funds, and overall achieve lower returns. Our paper shows that fund flows are affected by information costs of obtaining benchmark information.

Our results leave open the question of which pricing model is correct, and consequently which risk-adjustment procedure investors *should* employ. We conclude that if additional benchmarking information were presented to investors, they would alter their capital allocation decisions. Our findings make policy remedies for sub-optimal investor capital allocation simple. If paying attention requires costly effort, then easier availability of relevant information could be welfare improving. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section I discusses data. Section II provides a description of the methodology employed. Section III presents results; Section IV discusses additional results and robustness tests. Section V concludes.

## I Data

We use a monthly panel of sector fund returns as our main dataset. To identify our fund universe, we follow the approach of Hartzell, Mühlhofer, and Titman (2016). We begin by considering the entire sample of mutual funds in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivorship-Bias Free Mutual Fund Database from 1990 to the end of 2009. We eliminate index funds. We then look for specialized *Sector Funds*, by examining the Lipper Objective Codes to find funds that invest in US Equity with strategies that are concentrated in one industry, or sector. Over our time period, the only industry specialty sectors with significant fund presence are *Health and Biotechnology* (henceforth *Healthcare*), *Natural Resources*, *Real Estate*, *Science and Technology*, *Telecommunications*, and

*Utilities*.<sup>10</sup> Because Sector funds did not appear in significant numbers before the year 1998, we begin our sample at that point in time.

## I.A Constructing Sector Benchmark Returns

For our study, we need returns data for sector benchmarks. Even though there may be some variation in the specific index chosen by each fund, each of these sector indices approximates a value-weighted portfolio of securities in that sector. Many such indices are proprietary, and thus actual index returns are difficult to obtain. The alternative of using returns data for exchange-traded funds (ETFs) in each sector as a proxy for the sector index is also infeasible, as many sectors do not have ETFs over the entire time sample. Additionally, if an ETF does exist in a given sector, it may not be liquid enough over the sample period to provide accurate return information. Therefore, we elect to construct our own sector benchmarks as value-weighted portfolios of sector securities, following the methodology of Hartzell, Mühlhofer, and Titman (2016). Given that commercially available sector benchmarks are highly correlated with a value-weighted portfolio of sector securities, these should provide a good proxy for the actual indices quoted by funds. We show below that, in a setting in which this question is tractable, this is indeed the case.

To construct our benchmarks, we begin by using MFLinks to identify unique fund portfolios among share classes, and then adding stock holdings for each portfolio, obtained from the Thomson-Reuters S12 Mutual Fund Holdings database. For each equity position, at each time period, for each fund, we include additional stock information from the CRSP monthly stock database. We then assemble security universes for each of the sectors covered by Sector Funds, in order to construct value-weighted bench-

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<sup>10</sup>A sector *Specialty* also exists, but we do not include these funds in our results, as these do not constitute a group of funds with a homogeneous investment objective (or benchmark), but rather a set of funds in small numbers which invest in single industries and do not fit into any of the aforementioned categories.



marks. For some of our sectors, exogenous specification of sector universes (such as, for example, SIC codes) would not be well-suited because these sector universes might span many such categorizations. As a result, we define sector universes endogenously. Specifically, we define a sector universe as the set of unique securities held in a given year by at least five percent of Sector Funds within a sector, or two portfolios (whichever is greater).<sup>11</sup> The benchmark portfolio for each sector is the value-weighted portfolio of all stocks within the sector, and the returns to this portfolio constitute our sector index.

Our condition that a stock must be held by at least five percent of funds (or two portfolios) to be a part of a sector universe is designed to avoid including equities that are clearly outside of a fund's natural sector universe but are nevertheless held by a small number of managers. For example, at several times in our data set, several Real Estate funds hold small positions in Microsoft. When forming a benchmark portfolio with weights that are based on relative market capitalization, Microsoft (a large, non-sector stock) would become the largest holding in this sector's benchmark portfolio. This would clearly be unwarranted, as Microsoft is not a Real Estate stock. We test our filter by comparing, for each sector, the returns to the benchmark portfolio assembled according to this filter to value-weighted returns of all Sector Funds in the respective sector and find a close match between the two series. We therefore believe that this filter is effective in defining sector universes.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>As an example, the *Real Estate* sector universe for 2005 is the set of all stocks held in at least five percent of Real Estate sector fund portfolios during the year 2005. There exists a natural overlap between Sector-Fund universes, so we allow these to share securities, as appropriate. For example, many firms that are classified as *Science and Technology* can also be classified as *Healthcare*, or *Natural Resources*, if these firms develop biotechnology or mineral extraction technology, respectively.

<sup>12</sup>In the Real Estate sector, where benchmark choice is fairly homogeneous, in that funds use either the Dow Jones Real Estate or the FTSE-NAREIT index (see e.g. Hartzell, Mühlhofer, and Titman (2010)), we also find that our benchmark portfolio has a correlation of more than 0.95 with these two indices.

## I.B Summary Statistics

Panel A of Table II shows summary statistics for our data, for each sector. For comparison, we also show summary statistics for Generalist Funds, a group of large diversified funds, which closely track the S&P 500. We begin by showing the number of unique portfolios that we identify in each sector. This number ranges from 20 for Telecommunications to 156 for Science and Technology. We identify 808 unique Generalist Fund portfolios. The table also shows distributional statistics for the number of unique portfolios that exist in a given year. Once again, the Telecommunications sector has the smallest number of these, with only 10.1 (10) portfolios in the mean (median) year, followed by Natural Resources with 22 (23). Health and Biotechnology and Utilities show similar numbers of funds with 33 (28) and 31 (34), respectively. Real Estate is the second most populated sector in this respect, with 43 (60) and Science and Technology the most populated, with 66 (57). Generalist Funds are more numerous than any single sector, with an average (median) year featuring 411 (450) portfolios.

The median fund's net asset value is comparable across sectors, at around \$100 million, except for Utilities, where the median is almost twice as large, at \$180 million. The median Generalist Fund is also about twice as large as the median (non-Utility) sector fund, at \$201 million. While all size distributions show some positive skewness, the upper halves of the size distributions differ markedly among sectors as evidenced by the variation in means, ranging from \$206 million for Telecommunications, to almost \$500 million for Utilities. The upper tail of the Generalist Fund distribution is much larger, as shown by the mean of \$1.3 billion.

Panel B of Table II provides descriptive statistics regarding fund and benchmark performance. Data are at monthly frequency and returns are in percentage points. The summary statistics are for the sample period (years 1998 to 2009). As expected, the average (active sector) fund has positive excess returns, but negative alphas with respect to the passive sector benchmark and the standard Fama-French-Carhart four factor model.

Figure 3 reports the four-factor risk-adjusted three-year rolling alpha of sector funds in the sample. The unit of observation is fund-month and the sample period is from Dec 1998–Dec 2009. The mean four-factor alpha is  $-1.3\%$ , the median is  $-1.2\%$ , and the standard deviation is  $1.06\%$ . The four-factor alpha for the 90th percentile fund is  $-0.04\%$  or about zero.

## **I.C Flow-to-Performance Sensitivity of Sector Funds**

The tests of which model is better in capturing investors' assessment of fund managers' skill are dependent on the shape of flow-to-performance relationship in sector funds, i.e., whether the relationship is linear or not. Empirical literature on equity mutual funds documents a convex shape, i.e. fund flows are sensitive to good performance while outflows are not as sensitive to bad performance (see Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Lynch and Musto, 2003). In contrast, Spiegel and Zhang (2013) argue that the flow response function convexity result is driven by misspecification of the empirical model. The authors conclude that the flow-return relation is linear. Recently, Goldstein, Jiang, and Ng (2016) show that bond funds do not exhibit convexity observed in equity funds, and the flow-to-performance sensitivity may even be concave.

Figure 4 conducts a non-parametric univariate analysis and reports the flow-to-performance sensitivity of sector funds to alpha of the fund with respect to the sector benchmark, to alpha of the sector with respect to the market benchmark, and to alpha of the fund with respect to the market benchmark (CAPM). In the leftmost figure, consistent with previous research, we find that sector equity funds exhibit a convex flow-to-performance sensitivity with respect to the benchmark, which is the sector. This univariate analysis shows that sector fund investors are not behaving very differently from investors in other equity funds.

## II Methodology

Section II.A describes a preliminary intuitive test which shows that investors are using information when it is made available to them. Section II.B explains why a more robust methodology is called for, and describes the related approaches in the literature. Section II.C presents our primary specification.

### II.A A Simple Approach

We argue that mutual-fund investors suffer from limited attention — paying attention requires costly effort (Kahneman, 1973). Hence, investors react to the information with which they are confronted, rather than following any particular asset pricing model. In the case of a generalist fund, only market and fund performance is available. It is therefore difficult to distinguish whether investors are deliberately employing the CAPM to allocate funds, or are simply using the information made available to them.

We therefore utilize data on sector funds — which provide performance information with respect to both the market and a sector benchmark. If our hypothesis that investors pay limited attention is correct, then we should expect that investors' choices in the case of sector funds depend on sector benchmark metrics. In contrast, if investors use only the CAPM, then fund flows should not depend on sector-benchmark performance.

#### II.A.1 The Simple Information Model

In the case of sector funds, an investor can make three choices based on three performance measures available to her: (i) market performance information helps an investor to decide whether to allocate capital to the stock market, (ii) sector performance data with respect to market performance data enables an investor to decide whether to allocate to the specific sector, and (iii) fund performance information within a sector helps an investor choose a specific fund. This logic motivates the following empirical specifi-

cation for fund  $j$  in sector  $s$  in market  $m$  at time  $t + 1$  based on returns at time  $t$  given by  $r_{k,t}$ , where  $k \in \{j, s, m\}$  (fund index, sector index and market, respectively):

$$\text{flow}_{j,t+1} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_M r_{m,t} + \gamma_{SM}(r_{s,t} - r_{m,t}) + \gamma_{FS}(r_{j,t} - r_{s,t}) + \gamma_t + \gamma_j + \epsilon_{j,t}, \quad (1)$$

In the equation above, the second, third, and fourth terms account for the three components of information that a sector-fund investor has at her disposal, as outlined above. If these information components drive investment choice, we should see each of them statistically affect fund flows. Time and fund fixed effects are denoted by  $\gamma_t$  and  $\gamma_j$ , respectively.

Throughout this section, we define fund flows using the measure that is common in this literature (see, for example, Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Barber, Huang, and Odean, 2016), as fractional change in the fund's total net assets, scaled by fund returns:

$$\text{flow}_{j,\tau} = \left( \frac{\text{TNA}_{j,\tau}}{\text{TNA}_{j,\tau-1}} - 1 \right) - r_{j,\tau} \quad (2)$$

In the above expression,  $\text{TNA}_{j,\tau}$  is the Total Net Assets for fund  $j$  at time  $\tau$ . Note that in Equation 1 we use flow at time  $t + 1$  while measuring returns at time  $t$ .

We conduct all tests at a monthly time horizon (i.e.  $t$  is in months). By using this time horizon we impose a stricter test for the presence of the relationship that we explore with regards to both speed of information flow, as well as the power of the tests. This is because information flows may be slower or administrative restrictions on, for example, retirement accounts may lead to slower response to fund performance.<sup>13</sup> Thus, our identification strategy requires that at least some investors respond quickly. Since the

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<sup>13</sup>However, Sialm, Starks, and Zhang (2015) show that this possibility of "sticky" flows may not be a major concern. They find that flows into funds from defined contribution assets are more volatile and exhibit more performance sensitivity than non-defined contribution flows, primarily due to plan sponsors. Literature has also provided general evidence that individual investors exhibit high turnover in their brokerage accounts (Barber and Odean, 2000; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2009).

remaining investors may respond slowly, our results provide a conservative lower bound on the sensitivities.

(1) does not adjust for risk. It is intended to reflect a marginal investor who is rather unsophisticated but who is nevertheless attentive to realized performance.

## II.A.2 Risk-Adjusted Outperformance

We modify the simple specification in (1), maintaining the focus on the three components of investor decision making (market return, sector outperformance, and fund outperformance), but measuring each of these with respect to a measure of alpha for the next period, rather than raw returns. The specification then becomes:

$$\text{flow}_{j,t+1} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_M(r_{m,t} - r_{f,t}) + \gamma_{FS}\alpha(\text{Fund} - \text{Sec})_{j,t} + \gamma_{SM}\alpha(\text{Sec} - \text{Mkt})_{s,t} + \gamma_j + \gamma_t + \epsilon_{j,t}. \quad (3)$$

This regression contains an intercept followed by the excess returns of the market over the risk-free rate (notation as defined before, with  $r_{f,t}$  the risk-free rate). The next two terms are, respectively, alpha of the fund over its sector benchmark, and of the sector over the market. We also include time and fund fixed effects.

These two measures are obtained as follows. We begin by estimating betas for each of the alphas. For  $\alpha(\text{Fund} - \text{Sec})$ , we run the following regression for each fund  $j$ :

$$(r_{j,t} - r_{f,t}) = \alpha + \beta_{j,s}(r_{s,t} - r_{f,t}) + \beta_{j,m}(r_{m,t} - r_{f,t}) + \epsilon_t. \quad (4)$$

We run this regression for each fund  $j$  and month  $t$ , over a three-year rolling window (i.e. from month  $t - 35$  to month  $t$ ). We thus derive, for each fund at each time a  $\beta_{j,s,t}$  (three-year Beta of fund  $j$  with respect to its sector at time  $t$ ), and a  $\beta_{j,m,t}$  (three-year Beta of fund  $j$  with respect to the market at time  $t$ ). We then calculate the  $\alpha(\text{Fund} - \text{Sec})$  as:

$$\alpha(\text{Fund} - \text{Sec})_{j,t} = (r_{j,t} - r_{f,t}) - \beta_{j,s,t}(r_{s,t} - r_{f,t}) - \beta_{j,m,t}(r_{m,t} - r_{f,t}). \quad (5)$$

To compute  $\alpha(\text{Sec} - \text{Mkt})$  we proceed analogously, but estimate a “one-factor” model of the *sector benchmark* over the market. Specifically we run the following regression:

$$\begin{aligned} (r_{s,t} - r_{f,t}) &= \alpha + \beta_{s,m}(r_{m,t} - r_{f,t}) + \epsilon_t \\ \alpha(\text{Sec} - \text{Mkt})_{s,t} &= (r_{s,t} - r_{f,t}) - \beta_{s,m,t}(r_{m,t} - r_{f,t}). \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

While (3) effectively reflects the spirit of our hypothesis, it makes certain implicit assumptions. Section II.B relaxes these assumptions and discusses a robust approach which is our main test.

## II.B A Robust Approach

The specifications described in section II.A are intuitive and efficient, conditional on certain assumptions. In particular, (1) and (3) require a linear flow-performance relationship that is common to all funds. To ensure that our results are not an artifact of this assumption, we now consider the more robust methodologies of Barber, Huang, and Odean (2016) and Berk and van Binsbergen (2016) in some detail.

The primary specification from Barber, Huang, and Odean (2016) is:

$$F_{p,t} = a + \sum_i \sum_j b_{i,j} D_{i,j,p,t} + cX_{p,t} + \mu_t + \epsilon_{p,t}, \quad (7)$$

where flows for fund  $p$  and time  $t$  are projected onto a set of control variables,  $X$ , and a collection of indicators,  $D$ , corresponding to the fund’s alpha decile rankings according to two competing models,  $i$  and  $j$ . For example, if the estimated alpha according to model  $i$  is in decile 4 while the estimated alpha according to model  $j$  is in decile 7, then  $D_{4,7,p,t} = 1$  and  $D_{i \neq 4, j \neq 7, p, t} = 0$ . This specification abstracts away from the numerical estimates of alpha and considers only relative rankings. It is therefore robust to nonlinearities in the flow-performance relationship.

To assess the relative predictive powers of models of  $i$  and  $j$ , the authors compare  $\sum_{i>j} b_{i,j}$  and  $\sum_{i<j} b_{i,j}$ . If the difference is statistically significant, then it can be reasonably concluded that one model is more consistent with investors' decisions than the other.<sup>14</sup> Note, however, that the  $b_{i,j}$ 's are assumed not to depend on the fund — the exact (nonlinear) flow-performance relationship is common to all funds.

The methodology proposed by Berk and van Binsbergen (2016) is robust to this assumption as well, allowing heterogeneous (nonlinear) flow-performance relationships. They estimate:

$$\text{sign}(F_{p,t}) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \left( \frac{\text{sign}(\alpha_{p,t}^i)}{\text{Var}(\text{sign}(\alpha_{p,t}^i))} - \frac{\text{sign}(\alpha_{p,t}^j)}{\text{Var}(\text{sign}(\alpha_{p,t}^j))} \right) + \epsilon_{p,t}, \quad (8)$$

where the nomenclature has been slightly modified to allow straightforward comparison with (7).  $\gamma_1 > 0$  if and only if model  $i$  is a better pricing model than model  $j$ , at least with respect to explaining fund flows. By considering only the signs of both flows and alphas, (8) makes no assumptions about the functional form of the flow-performance relationship, either within or across funds. Positive alphas should be associated with positive flows, and vice-versa.

While the specification is robust to fund-level heterogeneity, we note that — in keeping with its Berk and Green (2004) frame of reference — it does not control for any potential determinants of flows other than realized performance. In contrast, (7) has an overall mean,  $\alpha$ , time fixed effects,  $\mu_t$ , and fund-level controls,  $X_{p,t}$ . We include fund and month-year fixed effects and fund-level controls in our tests. Overall, the two approaches are largely consistent. We implement two robust specifications, described in section II.C, that build on the strengths of both previous approaches.

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<sup>14</sup>An alternative test could impose a monotonicity constraint, such that the  $b$  coefficients are weakly monotonic in both  $i$  and  $j$ . This would still allow for a nonlinear flow-performance relationship, but it would disallow some locally suboptimal behaviors (for example, negative marginal flows for improving rank) that would otherwise be admissible.



## II.C Implementation

To implement a robust specification, we first redefine fund flows. Over a horizon of length  $T$ , this is:

$$F_{p,t} = q_{p,t} - q_{p,t-T} \left( 1 + R_{p,t}^V \right), \quad (9)$$

where  $R_{p,t}^V$  is defined as the projection of fund  $p$ 's returns on the space of available Vanguard index funds — i.e. the passive alternative investment opportunity. We take  $R_{p,t}^V$  to be the return on the relevant sector benchmark. Note that the imputation of fund flows in (9), which follows Berk and van Binsbergen (2016), is different from the one we used in (2). The latter approach, used by other researchers, corresponds to a measure of investors' explicit actions. If a fund ends a period with more (or less) assets than its own returns can explain, it must be due to investors' fund flows.

To understand the alternative flow measurement approach, we decompose the fund's actual return into two components, the return on the fund-mimicking passive portfolio and the difference between these returns:

$$R_{p,t} = R_{p,t}^V + \Delta R_{p,t}. \quad (10)$$

Thus, (9) can be re-written as

$$F_{p,t} = q_{p,t} - q_{p,t-T} (1 + R_{p,t}) + q_{p,t-T} \Delta R_{p,t}, \quad (11)$$

where the last "adjustment" term is not present in the usual flow measure, i.e., (2).

We define the signal of managerial skill on fund  $p$  with respect to pricing model  $j$  to be:

$$\alpha_{p,t+1}^j = R_{p,t+1}^e - R_{p,t+1}^j, \quad (12)$$

i.e., the difference between the fund's excess return and its risk-adjusted return. If model  $j$  is a linear factor (beta) model, then

$$R_{p,t+1}^j = F_{t+1}^j \hat{\beta}_p^j \quad (13)$$

and

$$\alpha_{p,t}^j = \prod_{s=t-T+1}^t \left( 1 + R_{p,s}^e - F_s^j \hat{\beta}_p^j \right) - 1. \quad (14)$$

We compute this signal of skill conditional on two simple models: a single factor model (CAPM) and a two-factor model that includes both the market return and the sector's benchmark return. While one could estimate (13) once for each fund, over the entire sample, we employ rolling regressions to estimate the factor loadings in (13) and, in turn, the managerial skill in (14). Our approach increases the noise in the estimates. At the same time, it corresponds to the information set actually available to investors in real time and avoids any look-ahead bias.

Finally, in addition to estimating (8) as a test for the limited attention hypothesis, we draw upon the strengths of both approaches and develop a hybrid specification. We compute decile ranks for funds with respect to both the CAPM and the sector model, as in Barber, Huang, and Odean (2016). Then, we create an indicator variable  $D_{i,j,p,t}$  that equals one when the decile rank according to model  $i$  is higher than the decile rank according to model  $j$ . This effectively collapses the upper off-diagonal 45 cells of the  $10 \times 10$  matrix into a single statistic and allows us to conduct a joint test of the superiority of the sector fund model over the CAPM. We estimate the following specification:

$$\text{sign}(F_{p,t}) = \alpha + b_{i,j} D_{i,j,p,t} + c X_{p,t} + \mu_t + \eta_p + \epsilon_{p,t}, \quad (15)$$

As the cells have non-linear flow effects, Barber, Huang, and Odean (2016) compare the differences in a pairwise manner and report the sum of coefficient differences. We

sidestep this issue by utilizing the sign of fund flows, as in Berk and van Binsbergen (2016), allowing for robust aggregation across funds.

### **III Results**

This section provides our main result that investors, suffering limited attention, are responding to readily available information in making fund flow decisions. Section III.A reports the results of the tests described in Section II.A. Section III.B shows that a model that includes sector benchmark is better able to explain fund flows than the CAPM. Section III.C utilizes a nested model test to provide further evidence that investors use additional information provided by the sector benchmark when making investment decisions.

#### **III.A Raw and Risk Adjusted Outperformance**

Below, we first test whether investor fund flows in sector funds responds to raw sector benchmark returns. Next, we risk-adjust the returns and test the sensitivity of fund flows to sector benchmark returns.

##### **III.A.1 Raw Outperformance**

Table III estimates fractional fund flow at time  $t + 1$  (next month) into a specific sector fund based on returns to the S&P 500 ( $S\&P_t$ ), the difference between returns to the sector benchmark and returns to the S&P 500 ( $Sec - S\&P$ ), and the difference between returns to the fund and returns to the sector benchmark ( $Fund - Sec$ ) (Eq. 1). The columns progressively include additional fixed effects, starting from sector fixed effects in column (2), fund fixed effects in column (3) and time period (month-year) fixed effects in column (4). The standard errors are clustered at the fund level across all specifications.

Column (1) reports estimates obtained from a pooled OLS model that puts equal weights on funds. The specification shows that sector performance compared to market performance is an important driver of capital flows into sector funds. For each percentage point (pp) over-performance of a sector, the aggregate assets under management (AUM) in the sector increase by 13 basis points (bps). In addition, one pp superior performance of a fund compared to its sector leads to an additional 30 bps flow into the fund in the next month. Fund size is included following Sirri and Tufano (1998), who point out that fund size reduces search costs for retail investors. The negative coefficient shows that larger funds have lower fund flow sensitivity. A potential concern may be that our results are driven by a specific sector. Column (2) includes sector fixed effects to address this concern. Our results remain statistically and quantitatively similar. Column (3) includes fund fixed effects. The results remain similar in magnitude. This shows that persistent fund specific characteristics are not driving our results: within funds, periods with higher sector benchmark returns experience more fund flows.

The most exhaustive specification (Column 4) with fund-level fixed effects and month fixed effects shows that the results remain robust across specifications. Thus, even after controlling for persistent fund-level characteristics and aggregate characteristics that include S&P 500 returns and any additional economic outcomes, we find that the fund flows show similar sensitivity to sector benchmark returns. Column (4) reports that for each percentage point outperformance of a sector compared to the market, the AUM of a fund in the sector grows by 13 bps. For each pp outperformance of a fund in a sector, the AUM grows by 23 bps, which is approximately twice the sensitivity of the sector outperformance.

### **III.A.2 One Factor Risk-adjusted Outperformance**

Table IV reports the estimation results for the specification that uses alphas rather than raw returns (Eq. 3). Column (1) reports estimates obtained from a pooled specification. It

shows that for each pp increase in alpha of a fund with respect to the sector benchmark, the fund flows increase by 31 bps in the next month. In addition, for each pp increase in alpha of the sector compared to the market, fund flows increase by 14 bps. Column (2) includes sector fixed effects and obtains similar qualitative and quantitative results. Column (3) obtains similar results in a within fund framework.

Column (4), which is the most exhaustive specification with fund and month-year fixed effects, reports that for each pp outperformance of a sector compared to the market, as measured by alpha of the sector compared to the market index, the assets under management (AUM) of a fund in the sector grows by 15 bps. In addition, for each pp outperformance of a fund in a sector compared to the sector as measured by the alpha of the fund in a one factor (sector) model, the AUM grows by 31 bps. These numbers are statistically and economically significant and are similar in magnitude to those obtained in Table III. As before the flows are twice as sensitive to fund outperformance with respect to the sector compared to sector outperformance with respect to the market.

### **III.B Robust Approach**

The results above provide evidence that investors utilize sector benchmark data when making allocation decisions. To establish that a model that includes sector benchmarks is “better” at explaining fund flows than CAPM, we use the semi-parametric approach of Berk and van Binsbergen (2016). The authors point out that whenever mutual fund investors observe a manager out- or under-performing the benchmark, investors update the signal about the manager’s talent. In turn, the fund will experience a corresponding inflow or outflow, respectively. However, without assumptions regarding the distribution of investors’ priors and posteriors, and the fund’s decreasing return to scale function in terms of AUM, the magnitude of the capital response is hard to quantify. A way to sidestep the issue is to focus on the direction of the capital response. The sign of the realized return outperformance given the null of a specific model and the sign of the

capital inflows should correlate positively. To compare two models, (8) regresses the standardized difference in sign of outperformance of a fund in a period based on the respective models on the sign of flow performance.

Table V presents the results. The main variable of interest is the “Diff of Signs” variable which is the difference in signs of fund outperformance measured by the two-factor sector-plus-market model and the one-factor market model. A statistically and economically significant coefficient suggests that the two-factor “sector” model is a better model than CAPM to capture investor allocation of funds. An important note is that, the approach of comparing nulls of investor preference of a certain model is applicable to models which may be behavioral in nature. In our case, we argue that investors respond to sector benchmarks when that information is provided, despite sector returns not being priced risk factors. The first column shows a pooled OLS estimate. In the second column, we add indicator variables for funds in each sector. This addresses concerns regarding persistent differences in sectors regarding fund flows. Column (3) reports a regression with fund fixed effects, which controls for time-independent differences in returns to scale of funds and distribution of investors’ priors and posteriors. Column (4) provides a regression with both fund- and time-period fixed effects. All specifications include fund size to address search cost differences (Sirri and Tufano, 1998) and differences in returns to scale of funds (Berk and Green, 2004; Stambaugh, 2014; Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor, 2015).

Column (1) shows that the coefficient of “Diff of Signs” variable is positive and significant. This suggests that the investors use the sector fund benchmark along with market returns to determine whether the manager outperformed in a specific period, and this model explains fund flow signs better than the null that the investors are using CAPM to evaluate skill of fund managers. Column (2) includes sector fixed effects and obtains similar results. Column (3) includes fund-specific fixed effects. The coefficient remains similar in magnitude, suggesting that differences in fund specific investor priors or pos-

teriors or other persistent differences such as how the funds are marketed (Del Guercio and Reuter, 2014) are not driving the results. In addition, the presence of fund size in every period as an additional control along with the fund fixed effects suggest that differences in skill and returns to scale of managers (Berk and Green, 2004; Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015) do not explain away the results. Finally, Column (4) includes time fixed effects to address the possibility that aggregate economic characteristics or high investor sentiments in certain periods (Chiu and Kini, 2014) are driving the results. The results remain similar in statistical power and magnitude.

Table VI utilizes a hybrid approach as described in Section II.C. We rank funds based on whether they outperform the CAPM or the sector model into deciles as in Barber, Huang, and Odean (2016). Then, we create an indicator variable that equals one when the sector model rank is superior to CAPM. The indicator variable collapses the upper off-diagonal cells into one metric and allows for a joint test. We regress the indicator variable on the sign of fund flows to compare the models in a manner that allows robust aggregation across funds.

Columns (1) and (2) report the estimates when we divide outperformance into deciles as in Barber, Huang, and Odean (2016). We also conduct robustness tests in columns (3) and (4) where we divide the funds into terciles. This is a more stringent test because the disagreement has to be stronger: top tercile by sector fund rank and bottom tercile by CAPM. Columns (1)–(4) confirm that when the two models disagree with respect to the quantile rank of alpha, investors allocate capital in the direction of the sector model alpha.

### **III.C A Nested Model Test**

Another approach to test whether investors suffer from limited attention but utilize additional information when it is easily available, is to test if a model that nests additional information regarding sector benchmarks is a better predictor of fund flows. Hence,

we nest the alpha estimated with respect to the sector benchmark in a specification that uses the CAPM alpha to explain the fund flows. Given the non-linearities in fund flows, we again use the nested specification to predict the sign of fund flows. Further, given that the skill of a fund manager estimated against the sector benchmark may have a correlated component with the skill estimated of a fund manager using CAPM, we take the component of alpha that is orthogonal to the alpha estimated using the CAPM. The specification is below:

$$\text{sign}(\text{flow}_{j,t+1}) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_{FM}\alpha(\text{Fund} - \text{Mkt})_{s,t} + \gamma_{FS}\text{Orthog.}\alpha(\text{Fund} - \text{Sec})_{j,t} + \epsilon_{j,t}. \quad (16)$$

Table VII reports the results. The CAPM  $\alpha$  and orthogonalized alpha compared to the sector benchmark are standardized. Comparing the adjusted  $R^2$  in columns (1) and (2), we note that the skill of the manager estimated using the sector benchmark, even after orthogonalization, explains almost the same amount of the variance in sign of next month fund flows as the CAPM alpha. When we include fund and month fixed effects, we obtain similar increases in explanatory power between columns (3) and (4).

To test whether the nested model is superior we conduct a two-step test. First, we regress the sign of fund flow on the controls (fund size, fund fixed effects, year-month fixed effects). We then include CAPM  $\alpha$ , and finally orthogonalized sector  $\alpha$ . The Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) with only controls is 169,622 and falls to 167,102 with CAPM  $\alpha$ . It further falls to 164,167 with orthogonalized sector  $\alpha$ . The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) similarly falls from 170,663 to 168,152 and further to 165,226. Thus, both criteria suggest that including the orthogonalized sector  $\alpha$  is the preferred model.



## **IV Additional Discussion and Robustness**

Section IV.A conducts tests using aggregate sector-level fund flows and finds additional evidence in favor of our argument. Section IV.B tests the difference in returns investors who use a two-factor sector model compared to a four-factor model. Section IV.C provides additional experimental evidence. Section IV.D conducts additional robustness tests.

### **IV.A Fund flows at the Aggregate Level**

So far, our results have been obtained using equal weights on all funds. Though we have included fund fixed effects, a potential concern may be that the fund flow results are driven by small, and therefore, under-representative funds. We now utilize aggregate sector-level monthly flows to determine whether these flows respond to sector outperformance compared to the market index.

Table VIII reports the results. In column (1), we include month fixed effects. Column (2) includes month and sector fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) repeat the exercise with an indicator variable that is one if the sector outperforms the market index. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level. Column (1) shows that aggregate fund flows into the sector funds increase by 14 bps for each percentage point outperformance of the sector with respect to the market index. This magnitude is very similar to that obtained in Section III.A which conducted an analysis at individual fund level. Columns (3) and (4), using an indicator variable, again find statistically significant results.

These results suggest that our findings are present at fund and sector level flows.

### **IV.B A Horse Race**

Next, we conduct a horse race between an investor facing limited attention who uses readily available information, and an investor who utilizes the four-factor model to in-

vest. This provides an estimate of the magnitude of loss in risk-adjusted returns faced by the former investor or an estimate of the cost of information acquisition. This exercise will also provide a welfare estimate of the benefit of better information provision in mutual fund prospectuses.

Figure 5 reports the distribution of returns for an investor who invests next month in the top decile performers in terms of four-factor alpha in the current month. The unit of observation is fund-month and the sample period is from Dec 1998–Dec 2009. The universe of funds is all sector funds. It is expected that such a strategy will not deliver strong outperformance since the literature has shown that mutual fund outperformance in terms of the four-factor model is not very persistent (Carhart, 1997; Bollen and Busse, 2005).

A comparison shows that a strategy where an investor chases returns based on four-factor alpha has a mean return of -1.68% annually, with a median of -1.63% with the 90th percentile return at 2.18%. An investor who utilizes sector benchmark information and fund benchmark information with a relative loading as given in Column (4) of Table IV, i.e. approximately half the weight on sector outperformance of S&P compared to fund outperformance of sector, will receive an average return of -1.81% with a median of -1.76% and a 90th return of 1.31%. Thus, the four-factor model slightly outperforms, even though the difference during our sample period and for our sample of the universe of sector funds is not statistically significant. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test yields a p-value of 0.696, which suggests that the null (that the distributions are the same) cannot be rejected in our sample. A t-test of the difference of the mean four-factor alphas of the two strategies also provides a statistically insignificant result.

These results suggest that sector fund investors are losing a small amount of returns as a result of limited attention.

## IV.C Additional Experimental Evidence

Our empirical results are based on fund level data. In this section, we conduct an out-of-sample micro-level test of our argument that availability of information regarding benchmarks affects investment choices. A benefit is that we are able to control for respondent characteristics and conduct within respondent comparisons. An important caveat, which is generally applicable, is that experimental subjects are not similar to mutual fund investors. Therefore, the results in this section, are only suggestive.

### IV.C.1 Experimental Setup and Design

We conduct an online survey on the Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk) platform.<sup>15</sup> The survey recruited a sample of 149 individuals living in the U.S.<sup>16</sup> We collect demographic characteristics that include age, gender, race, and education. In addition, we collect financial information such as income, employment status, industry of employment, investing experience, and risk tolerance. Summary statistics of the complete set of respondent characteristics are provided in Panel A of Table IX.

In a randomized control trial, the main question we ask the participants is to allocate \$100 into three funds: a fund investing in government securities, a generalist mutual fund and a sector fund. Each respondent is provided five allocation scenarios where the performance numbers are randomly drawn from uniform distributions.<sup>17</sup> In each scenario respondents are given performance figures for the government fund, the generalist fund, a market index, and the sector fund. The returns are drawn from independent uniform distributions. Market and sector returns are drawn from an interval of [0%, 20%],

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<sup>15</sup>Recent studies that use the same platform include Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser (2011) and Kuziemko, Norton, Saez, and Stantcheva (2015) among others. Casler, Bickel, and Hackett (2013) compared the online responses of participants recruited via Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk), social media and face-to-face behavioral testing, and found that mTurk respondents are more diverse and yet their behavioral test results are indistinguishable across the three groups of participants.

<sup>16</sup>The survey on average lasted approximately 5 minutes 18 seconds. Participants received 75 cents, which is competitive in the mTurk marketplace.

<sup>17</sup>The range of distributions for Market Index and Sector Index were from 0 to 20%, while the risk-free index varied from 0 to 4%.

where return of government securities range from 0% to 4%. Further, the treatment group only, is also provided performance figures for a sector index. Given their respective performance figures, respondents are then asked to allocate their capital. The summary statistics of allocation decisions are also provided in Panel A of Table IX.

#### IV.C.2 Experimental Findings

Using the allocation decisions of survey respondents, we conduct two simple tests. First, we test a relevance condition: whether the presence of information regarding benchmarks affects allocation decisions at all. This test can shed some light on why many investors do not invest in sector funds: they may find information about sector funds difficult to obtain because paying to attention to a new class of funds requires costly effort.

Column (1) of Panel B in Table IX reports that in presence of the treatment of benchmark information, survey investors allocate on average 6.3% of their portfolio to sector funds. This result remains similar after including fund and market performance metrics in column (2), demographic controls (age, income, education, marital status, gender, race and state of residence) in column (3), and financial controls (home owner status, employment status, industry of employment, investing experience, investing experience in mutual funds and risk aversion) in column (4). Thus, the presence of information regarding benchmark returns positively affects allocation to sector funds on average. In column (4), our most exhaustive specification, investors allocate approximately 5.1% of their portfolio to sector funds in the presence of benchmark information.

Second, we test *how* the presence of benchmark information affects investment decisions. To compare the experimental data with real fund level data, we run an analysis similar to the results in Section III.A (Table III) within the subset of survey respondents who received sector benchmark performance information. Panel C of Table IX reports the results. Since the portfolio allocation decision requires investors to allocate between

a government securities and equity market (market fund and sector fund), we find that when the market performs well, investors invest more in equities. In addition, as in Table III, we find that investors respond in a statistically and economically significant manner to the fund outperformance with respect to the sector and sector outperformance with respect to the market.

An important observation is that even after controlling for variation in demographic characteristics in column (2) and financial characteristics in column (3), the results obtain. The results, that investors respond to the fund outperformance with respect to the sector and sector outperformance with respect to the market, obtain even after all individual investor fixed effects are included in column (4). This finding is consistent with the argument that inherent differences between sector fund investors and other investors are not driving the allocation results. In sum, the experiment provides suggestive evidence in support of the argument that if investors are provided additional information such as the sector benchmark, they respond to it.

#### **IV.D Robustness Tests**

Table X tests whether our results are driven by a subsample of fund-month observations, in which performance sensitivity is either high or low. It may be that investors who are more/less sensitive to short-term performance may behave differently compared to other investors. Such sensitivity to short-term performance may be related to investor sophistication. In this case, for example, more performance-sensitive investors may use the CAPM more or less than the sector benchmark model.

We first calculate the fund flows in the next month scaled by the four-factor alpha of the fund in a particular month. Focusing on the sample where the fund flow sensitivity thus calculated is positive, we divide the observations into terciles based on fund flow sensitivity. Columns (1) and (2) report the estimates of Eq. (3). We find that funds with lower fund-flow sensitivity respond with lower sensitivities to the two benchmarks, and

those with higher sensitivity to performance measured by four-factor alpha have higher sensitivity to the sector and fund outperformance. However, results remain statistically significant in the cross-section of observations. Columns (3) and (4) test whether CAPM better describes investor behavior in the two subsamples by reporting the coefficients of Eq. (8). Again, by noting the statistically significant and positive coefficient of the difference of signs variable in both columns, we find that the sector benchmark model better explains investor behavior in both subsamples.

Table XI reports the results of a regression where we estimate fund flows against the binary variables of whether funds outperform the sector and whether a specific sector outperforms the market. The results remain similar to those reported in Section II.A. To address the possibility that investors are not just using a two-factor model that includes the sector benchmark, but the four-factor model, Table XII includes the monthly fund four-factor alpha as an additional control. The results obtained in Table IV remain robust.

## V Conclusion

We shed new light on a puzzling finding of recent literature, namely that mutual-fund flows suggest investors are utilizing the CAPM to allocate funds. This behavior is despite clear evidence that multi-factor models provide better performance assessment. We argue that investors, rather than being averse to only market risk, exhibit limited attention. Therefore, investors pay attention to readily-available information.

Since most mutual funds list a primary benchmark that approximates the market portfolio, it appears as if investors are utilizing the CAPM. We use the natural laboratory of sector funds (which provide a sector benchmark in addition to a market benchmark) in order to disentangle the limited attention hypothesis from a belief in the CAPM. Results show that investors respond to the sector benchmarks to evaluate fund managers.

The conclusion of this paper — that investors pay limited attention and therefore respond to salient and plausibly relevant information — has important policy implications. Mutual funds may want to provide additional relevant benchmark information to fund investors. This will reduce the cost of information acquisition for investors exhibiting limited attention and increase their ability to allocate funds more efficiently.

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


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### Year-by-Year Returns



During the periods shown in the chart:

	Returns	Quarter ended
Highest Quarter Return	19.09%	June 30, 2009
Lowest Quarter Return	-27.07%	December 31, 2008
Year-to-Date Return	-2.15%	March 31, 2016

### Average Annual Returns

After-tax returns are calculated using the historical highest individual federal marginal income tax rates, but do not reflect the impact of state or local taxes. Actual after-tax returns may differ depending on your individual circumstances. The after-tax returns shown are not relevant if you

hold your shares in a retirement account or in another tax-deferred arrangement. Return After Taxes on Distributions and Sale of Fund Shares may be higher than other returns for the same period due to a tax benefit of realizing a capital loss upon the sale of fund shares.

For the periods ended December 31, 2015	Past 1 year	Past 5 years	Past 10 years
<b>Fidelity® Magellan® Fund</b>			
Return Before Taxes	4.06%	10.88%	5.54%
Return After Taxes on Distributions	2.27%	9.23%	4.13%
Return After Taxes on Distributions and Sale of Fund Shares	3.81%	8.39%	4.41%
S&P 500® Index (reflects no deduction for fees, or expenses, or taxes)	1.38%	12.57%	7.31%

### Investment Adviser


Fidelity Management & Research Company (FMR) (the Adviser) is the

fund's manager. FMR Co., Inc. (FMRC) and other investment advisers serve as sub-advisers for the fund.

Figure 1: Performance information from Fidelity Magellan's prospectus.

This figure shows the performance page of an average fund on Morningstar. The page illustrates that besides fund performance, market-index performance is available to investors.

**Class A Annual Total Returns**



Best Quarter:	Q3'10	12.21%
Worst Quarter:	Q3'08	-13.14%

**Average Annual Total Returns**

(figures reflect sales charges)  
For the periods ended December 31, 2015

	1 Year	5 Years	10 Years
<b>Franklin Utilities Fund - Class A</b>			
Return Before Taxes	-11.33%	9.77%	7.59%
Return After Taxes on Distributions	-12.66%	8.75%	6.64%
Return After Taxes on Distributions and Sale of Fund Shares	-5.32%	7.77%	6.19%
<b>Franklin Utilities Fund - Class C</b>	-8.71%	10.16%	7.52%
<b>Franklin Utilities Fund - Class R</b>	-7.75%	10.32%	7.68%
<b>Franklin Utilities Fund - Class R6</b>	-7.15%	4.90% <sup>1</sup>	—
<b>Franklin Utilities Fund - Advisor Class</b>	-7.31%	10.88%	8.22%
S&P 500 <sup>®</sup> Utilities Index (index reflects no deduction for fees, expenses or taxes)	-4.85%	11.04%	7.41%
S&P 500 <sup>®</sup> Index (index reflects no deduction for fees, expenses or taxes)	1.38%	12.57%	7.31%

1. Since inception May 1, 2013.

No one index is representative of the Fund's portfolio.

[Click to view the fund's prospectus](#) or [statement of additional information](#).

Figure 2: Performance information from the Franklin Utilities Fund prospectus.

This figure shows the performance information from the prospectus of a typical sector fund. In addition to the fund's historical performance, investors are shown benchmark performance for the overall market (S&P 500) as well as the relevant sector index (S&P 500 Utilities).




Figure 3: Risk-Adjusted Out-performance of Sector Funds

This figure reports the four factor risk-adjusted three year rolling alpha of sector funds in the sample. Unit of observation is fund-month and the sample period is from Dec 1998–Dec 2009.




Figure 4: Flow Performance Sensitivity

This figure reports the flow-to-performance sensitivity of Sector Funds with respect to Alpha of the Fund with respect to the Sector Benchmark, Alpha of the Sector with respect to the Market Benchmark, and Alpha of the fund with respect to the Market Benchmark (CAPM), respectively.




Figure 5: Horse race between the four factor model and sector benchmark model

This figure reports the distribution of returns for an investor who invests next month in the top decile performers in terms of four factor alpha in the current month. The unit of observation is fund-month and the sample period is from Dec 1998–Dec 2009, all sector funds.



Table I: Cross-correlation table

The table reports the correlation between monthly value weighted sector returns in our sample with monthly returns of the market index.

Variables	S&P 500 Index	Health & Biotech	Natural Rsrcs.	Real Estate	Science and Tech.	Telecom	Utils.
S&P 500 Index	1.000						
Health and Biotech.	0.765	1.000					
Natural Resources	0.593	0.473	1.000				
Real Estate	0.612	0.552	0.372	1.000			
Science and Tech.	0.836	0.615	0.483	0.392	1.000		
Telecom.	0.917	0.675	0.561	0.509	0.917	1.000	
Utilities	0.822	0.718	0.744	0.525	0.603	0.736	1.000

Table II: Summary Statistics

## Panel A: Summary Statistics for Funds by Sector

The table reports summary statistics for all fund-years by sector. For each sector, we list distributional statistics for the number of funds (defined as distinct portfolios, thus combining share classes) active each year, the total value of all equity positions for each fund, the number of unique securities in each portfolio, the number of S&P 500 securities in each portfolio, as well as the number of unique securities and unique S&P 500 securities in each sector universe. The data sample period is 1998–2009.

	Mean	Stdev	1st Quartile	Median	3rd Quartile
<b>Sector Health and Biotechnology:</b> 71 unique portfolios.					
Number of Funds	32.85	22.6	12.75	27.5	55
Equity Net Asset Value (\$ Millions)	600.4	1,821	23.31	137.4	482.2
Number of Unique Securities Held	62.89	37.3	41	54	74
Number of Unique S&P 500 Securities Held	19.44	11.39	11	19	26
Number of Securities in Sector Universe	220.3	67.9	165.5	243	257
Number of S&P 500 Securities in Sector Universe	39.42	12.4	25.5	41	50.5
<b>Sector Natural Resources:</b> 38 unique portfolios.					
Number of Funds	21.7	7.901	15.75	22.5	28.25
Equity Net Asset Value (\$ Millions)	401.7	1,027	33.59	96.83	330.6
Number of Unique Securities Held	54.68	28.19	36	49	71
Number of Unique S&P 500 Securities Held	19.81	11.94	10	19	27
Number of Securities in Sector Universe	199.7	73.48	163.5	201	240.5
Number of S&P 500 Securities in Sector Universe	58.37	9.305	52	60	65
<b>Sector Real Estate:</b> 94 unique portfolios.					
Number of Funds	43.3	28.38	13.75	59.5	67
Equity Net Asset Value (\$ Millions)	373.8	877	28.87	97.88	366.3
Number of Unique Securities Held	45.81	24.54	32	40	51.25
Number of Unique S&P 500 Securities Held	6.536	4.098	3	6	10
Number of Securities in Sector Universe	120.4	53.21	106	144	157.5
Number of S&P 500 Securities in Sector Universe	6.625	4.717	2	5	10.25
<b>Sector Science and Technology:</b> 156 unique portfolios.					
Number of Funds	65.5	48.37	17.75	56.5	106.5
Equity Net Asset Value (\$ Millions)	446.2	1,083	17.6	84.4	342.5
Number of Unique Securities Held	62.71	40.61	40	54	73
Number of Unique S&P 500 Securities Held	23.67	16.06	12	20	31
Number of Securities in Sector Universe	263.5	84.19	215	270	320.5
Number of S&P 500 Securities in Sector Universe	72.68	23.49	55	70	95
<b>Sector Telecommunications:</b> 20 unique portfolios.					
Number of Funds	10.11	5.943	6	10	13.5
Equity Net Asset Value (\$ Millions)	205.9	338.3	12.75	71.14	266.7
Number of Unique Securities Held	51.7	40.78	29	42	59
Number of Unique S&P 500 Securities Held	16.83	10.81	10	16	21
Number of Securities in Sector Universe	83.26	51.34	46	80	113
Number of S&P 500 Securities in Sector Universe	29.11	14.76	19	27	35
<b>Sector Utilities:</b> 46 unique portfolios.					
Number of Funds	31.3	8.591	31.5	34	37
Equity Net Asset Value (\$ Millions)	494.5	760.3	51.28	182.5	581.5
Number of Unique Securities Held	56.05	27.17	38	49	70
Number of Unique S&P 500 Securities Held	28.05	14.97	19	25	33
Number of Securities in Sector Universe	218	49.85	183	227	241
Number of S&P 500 Securities in Sector Universe	91.53	42.97	63	68	137.5
<b>Generalist Funds:</b> 808 unique portfolios.					
Number of Funds	410.6	163.4	302.2	450	554
Equity Net Asset Value (\$ Millions)	1,329	5,037	60.45	201.8	760.7
Number of Unique Securities Held	142.4	195.7	57	85	141
Number of Unique S&P 500 Securities Held	93.86	96.44	43	64	101
Number of Securities in Sector Universe	3,784	829.3	3,633	3,980	4,294
Number of S&P 500 Securities in Sector Universe	519.2	12.1	510.8	518	524.5

## Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Mutual Fund Performance Data

This table reports summary statistics of mutual fund performance data for the sample period (years 1998 to 2009). Data are at monthly frequency and returns are in percentage points.  $\alpha$  is computed as the difference between realized excess returns in month  $t$  minus realized excess returns to a set of benchmarks the same month, each multiplied by its respective Beta. For `fund - sec` the subject returns are the returns to a fund, and benchmarks are the fund's sector benchmark and the S&P 500. For `sec - S&P` the subject returns are the return to the fund's sector benchmark, and the benchmark is the S&P 500.

	mean	sd	min	max	N
Fund Flow (Next Month)	0.01	0.26	-9.45	9.34	62,913
S&P <sub>t</sub>	0.02	0.04	-0.14	0.13	64,818
Sector Benchmark Return	0.01	0.07	-0.29	0.41	64,818
Fund Return	0.01	0.07	-0.53	0.43	64,807
$\alpha(\text{fund} - \text{sec})_t$	-0.01	0.02	-0.37	0.24	63,930
$\alpha(\text{sec} - \text{S\&P})_t$	-0.01	0.04	-0.17	0.21	64,818
4 factor $\alpha_t$	-0.02	0.04	-0.34	0.22	63,930
log TNA	3.62	2.21	-2.30	9.90	63,909

Table III: Benchmark Returns and Fund Flows

Dependent variable: Fund flow, time  $t + 1$ . This table shows regressions of fractional fund flow at time  $t + 1$ , on an intercept, returns to the S&P 500 ( $S\&P_t$ ), the difference between returns to the sector benchmark and returns to the S&P 500 ( $Sec - S\&P$ ), and the difference between returns to the fund and returns to the sector benchmark ( $Fund - Sec$ ). We show for a panel of individual funds, a pooled-OLS regression, a regression with sector fixed effects, a regression with fund fixed effects, and a regression with fund and time-period fixed effects. We use monthly data.

	Next Month Fund Flows			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$S\&P_t$	0.00157 (0.07)	0.00277 (0.12)	0.0126 (0.56)	
$Sec_t - S\&P_t$	0.131*** (6.00)	0.121*** (5.32)	0.128*** (5.92)	0.134*** (4.93)
$Fund_t - Sec_t$	0.302*** (4.84)	0.298*** (4.74)	0.251*** (3.97)	0.233*** (3.55)
log TNA	-0.00837*** (-7.32)	-0.00845*** (-7.49)	-0.0352*** (-7.31)	-0.0366*** (-7.42)
Constant	0.0417*** (7.28)	0.0375*** (6.49)	0.139*** (7.84)	0.167*** (7.52)
Sector FE	No	Yes	No	No
Fund FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Month FE	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	62581	62581	62581	62581
Adjusted $R^2$	0.006	0.007	0.012	0.018

$t$  statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at fund level.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table IV: Impact of Risk Adjusted Out-performance on Fund Flows

Dependent variable: Fund flow, time  $t + 1$ . This table shows regressions of fractional fund flow at time  $t + 1$ , on an intercept, two risk-adjusted outperformance measures ( $\alpha$ ), first of a fund over its sector benchmark, then of the fund's sector benchmark over the S&P-500, as well as excess returns to the S&P 500 (S&P).  $\alpha$  is computed as the difference between realized excess returns in month  $t$  minus realized excess returns to a set of benchmarks the same month, each multiplied by its respective Beta. For *fund - sec* the subject returns are the returns to a fund, and benchmarks are the fund's sector benchmark and the S&P 500. For *sec - S&P* the subject returns are the return to the fund's sector benchmark, and the benchmark is the S&P 500. The first column shows a pooled OLS estimate. In the second column, we add dummy variables for funds in each sector. We then show a regression with fund fixed effects, and lastly a regression with both fund- and time-period fixed effects. We use monthly data.

	Next Month Fund Flows			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\alpha(\text{fund} - \text{sec})_t$	0.308*** (4.70)	0.320*** (4.87)	0.297*** (4.36)	0.312*** (4.39)
$\alpha(\text{sec} - \text{S\&P})_t$	0.142*** (6.27)	0.138*** (5.61)	0.134*** (5.60)	0.151*** (4.89)
$(\text{S\&P} - \text{Risk-free})_t$	0.0112 (0.49)	0.0111 (0.48)	0.0131 (0.59)	
log TNA	-0.00831*** (-7.28)	-0.00831*** (-7.38)	-0.0350*** (-7.28)	-0.0363*** (-7.38)
Constant	0.0422*** (7.41)	0.0370*** (6.44)	0.140*** (7.87)	0.163*** (7.27)
Sector FE	No	Yes	No	No
Fund FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Month FE	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	62302	62302	62302	62302
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.007	0.012	0.018

$t$  statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at fund level.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table V: Regressions of Sign of Index-Adjusted Fund Flow, on Differences of Signs in Outperformance

Dependent variable: sign of Index-Adjusted Fund Flow. This table shows results for a fund-level panel regression of the sign of the index-adjusted flow of funds to a mutual fund, on the difference in signs of fund outperformance measured by the two-factor sector-plus-market model and the one-factor market (CAPM) model. The first column shows a pooled OLS estimate. In the second column, we add dummy variables for funds in each sector. We then show a regression with fund fixed effects, and lastly a regression with both fund- and time-period fixed effects. We use monthly data.

	Sign of Index-Adjusted Fund Flow			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Diff of Signs	0.0366*** (8.77)	0.0444*** (9.25)	0.0425*** (12.17)	0.0510*** (14.40)
log TNA	0.00402 (0.85)	-0.00329 (-0.79)	0.0512*** (5.15)	0.0547*** (5.01)
Constant	-0.324*** (-18.67)	-0.372*** (-12.81)	-0.495*** (-13.61)	-0.314*** (-4.69)
Sector FE	No	Yes	No	No
Fund FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Month FE	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	62576	62576	62576	62576
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.004	0.031	0.006	0.036

*t* statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at fund level.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table VI: Regressions of Sign of Index-Adjusted Fund Flow on Relative Rank of Outperformance

Dependent variable: sign of Index-Adjusted Fund Flow. This table shows results for a fund-level panel regression of the sign of the index-adjusted flow of funds to a mutual fund, on the indicator variable that captures fund outperformance measured by the two-factor sector-plus-market model compared to the one-factor market (CAPM) model. The first two columns have fund performance ranked into deciles as in Barber, Huang, and Odean (2016) and the next two have fund performance ranked into terciles. The odd columns show regressions with fund fixed effects, and the even columns show regressions with both fund- and time-period fixed effects. We use monthly data.

	Next Month Fund Flows			
	Decile		Tercile	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rank( $\alpha_m$ ) $\leq$ Rank( $\alpha_s$ )	0.175*** (11.51)	0.227*** (15.92)	0.194*** (11.70)	0.238*** (14.65)
log TNA	0.0571*** (5.46)	0.0645*** (5.67)	0.0379** (3.29)	0.0566*** (4.61)
Constant	-0.614*** (-15.24)	-0.451*** (-6.05)	-0.568*** (-13.07)	-0.462*** (-5.12)
Fund FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	51188	51188	30677	30677
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.012	0.044	0.013	0.052

*t* statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at fund level.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table VII: Comparison of CAPM and Sector models on Fund Flows

Dependent variable: sign of Index-Adjusted Fund Flow. This table shows results for a fund-level panel regression of the sign of the index-adjusted flow of funds to a mutual fund, on the standardized alpha of CAPM and the standardized alpha with respect to a sector benchmark model which is orthogonal to the CAPM alpha. The first two columns compare the explanatory power of the two estimated alphas in a pooled setting. In the last two columns, we include funds and time-period fixed effects. We use monthly data.

	Sign of Index-Adjusted Fund Flow			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
CAPM $\alpha_t$	0.204*** (30.42)	0.209*** (31.12)	0.204*** (32.68)	0.200*** (32.30)
Orthog. $\alpha(\text{fund} - \text{sec})_t$		0.215*** (32.68)		0.209*** (32.71)
log TNA	-0.00131 (-0.29)	-0.000908 (-0.21)	0.0592*** (5.63)	0.0731*** (6.75)
Constant	-0.313*** (-18.71)	-0.315*** (-18.98)	-0.638*** (-9.56)	-0.490*** (-7.41)
Fund FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Month FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	62992	62992	62992	62992
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.045	0.094	0.070	0.116

*t* statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at fund level.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



Table VIII: Benchmark Returns and Aggregate Sector Flows

Dependent variable: Fund flow, time  $t + 1$ . This table shows regressions of aggregate fractional fund flow to a value-weighted portfolio of mutual funds in each sector at time  $t + 1$ , on an intercept, and the difference between returns to the sector benchmark and returns to the S&P 500 ( $Sec - S\&P$ ). The first two columns use as a primary independent variable the raw sector outperformance, while the third and fourth columns use an indicator variable equal to one when sector return weakly exceed S&P-500 returns and zero otherwise. We show for a panel of value-weighted fund portfolios (one for each sector), a pooled-OLS regression and a regression with time-period fixed effects. We use monthly data.

	Next Month Flows into Sector Funds			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$Sec_t - S\&P_t$	0.143** (4.75)	0.143** (4.57)		
$Sec_t \geq S\&P_t$			0.0157** (4.57)	0.0153** (4.11)
Constant	0.0135 (0.69)	0.0123 (0.61)	0.00535 (0.29)	0.00463 (0.24)
Sector FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	852	852	852	852
Adjusted $R^2$	0.342	0.343	0.341	0.341

$t$  statistics in parentheses, errors clustered at sector level.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## Table IX: Experimental Evidence

### Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Allocation Experiment

The table reports summary statistics of fund and index performance data for the experiment. The table also reports summary statistics of demographic and financial experience information collected during the survey. Risk Aversion is measured using the approach of Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002), who provide the survey questions in their Appendix C, Questions I and G. The Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scale is a psychometric scale that assesses risk taking in five content domains, one of which is financial decisions.

	mean	sd	min	max	N
Sector Fund Allocation	0.35	0.26	0.00	1.00	745
Market Fund Allocation	0.45	0.28	0.00	1.00	745
Treatment	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00	745
Sector Fund Return	0.10	0.06	0.00	0.20	745
Market Fund Return	0.10	0.06	0.00	0.20	745
Government Fund Return	0.02	0.014	0.00	0.04	745
Market Index Return	0.10	0.06	0.00	0.20	745
Sector Index Return	0.10	0.06	0.00	0.20	305
Government Index Return	0.02	0.014	0.00	0.04	745
Age	31–35	N/A	18–20	61–65	745
Income ('000s)	43.83	31.21	0.00	190.00	745
Gender	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00	745
Investor	0.60	0.49	0.00	1.00	730
Investor Mutual Fund	0.47	0.50	0.00	1.00	690
Risk Aversion	3.84	0.52	2.13	4.75	745

## Panel B: Sector Fund Allocation with or without Benchmark Information

Dependent variable: Sector Fund Allocation, next period. This table shows regressions of sector allocation decision, on an intercept, returns to the market fund, sector fund, market index, and the random treatment which is information regarding the benchmark index performance. The table utilizes allocation data from a panel of survey respondents.

	Sector Fund Allocation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.0630*** (3.33)	0.0629*** (3.59)	0.0669*** (3.80)	0.0511* (2.37)
Sector Fund		1.442*** (9.81)	1.426*** (9.54)	1.422*** (7.85)
Market Fund		-0.972*** (-6.54)	-0.957*** (-6.45)	-0.816*** (-4.55)
Market Index		-0.230 (-1.56)	-0.176 (-1.19)	-0.211 (-1.12)
Constant	0.328*** (26.10)	0.307*** (10.39)	0.285*** (5.74)	0.281* (2.14)
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Financial Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	745	745	735	545
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.013	0.175	0.183	0.152

*t* statistics in parentheses, standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### Panel C: Experimental Evidence regarding Information Availability

Dependent variable: Sector Fund Allocation, next period. This table shows regressions of sector allocation decision, on an intercept, returns to the market index, the difference between returns to the sector benchmark and returns to the market index (Sec – Mkt), and the difference between returns to the fund and returns to the sector benchmark (Fund – Sec). The table utilizes allocation data from a panel of survey respondents to mimic Table III that utilizes panel data for sector mutual funds.

	Sector Fund Allocation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mkt	1.652*** (4.64)	1.602*** (4.49)	1.732*** (3.78)	1.674*** (3.86)
Sec – Mkt	1.719*** (5.97)	1.691*** (6.03)	1.903*** (5.49)	1.816*** (5.41)
Fund – Sec	1.144*** (5.10)	1.134*** (5.23)	1.281*** (5.17)	1.201*** (4.51)
Constant	0.227*** (6.42)	0.197** (2.88)	0.396 (1.77)	0.215*** (4.81)
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No
Financial Controls	No	No	Yes	No
Individual FE	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	305	305	240	240
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.092	0.125	0.160	0.311

*t* statistics in parentheses, standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table X: Performance Sensitivity and Fund Flows

This table shows versions of the Risk-Adjusted Outperformance model (Table IV) and the Difference-of-Signs model (Table V), each using a split of the data by sensitivity of flow to performance. Columns (1) and (2) show the Risk-Adjusted Outperformance model for the least sensitive and most sensitive tercile of flow to performance, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) show this for the Difference-of-Signs model. Fixed effects are as note. We use monthly data.

	Next Month Fund Flows		Sign of Index-Adjusted Fund Flow	
	(Less Sensitive) (1)	(More Sensitive) (2)	(Less Sensitive) (3)	(More Sensitive) (4)
$\alpha(\text{fund} - \text{sec})_t$	0.182*** (26.27)	3.718*** (11.76)		
$\alpha(\text{sec} - \text{S\&P})_t$	0.136*** (39.56)	2.136*** (11.58)		
Diff of Signs			0.0619*** (7.42)	0.0259*** (4.15)
log TNA	0.000860*** (4.30)	-0.0460*** (-6.40)	0.0574** (3.24)	0.0723*** (4.25)
Constant	0.000588 (0.29)	0.178** (2.64)	-0.310 (-1.91)	-0.157 (-0.95)
Sector FE	No	Yes	No	No
Fund FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Month FE	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	12603	12476	12536	12403
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.435	0.106	0.045	0.047

*t* statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at fund level.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table XI: Impact of Signed Outperformance on Fund Flows

Dependent variable: Fund flow, time  $t + 1$ . This table shows regressions of fractional fund flow at time  $t + 1$ , on an intercept, returns to the S&P 500 ( $S\&P_t$ ), and two indicator variables. The first  $Sec_t \geq S\&P_t$  is equal to one if the difference between returns to the sector benchmark and returns to the S&P 500 is weakly positive and zero otherwise; the second  $Fund_t \geq Sec_t$  is equal to one if the difference between returns to the fund and returns to the sector benchmark is weakly positive and zero otherwise. We show for a panel of individual funds, a pooled-OLS regression, a regression with sector fixed effects, a regression with fund fixed effects, and a regression with fund and time-period fixed effects. We use monthly data.

Next Month Fund Flows				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$S\&P_t$	0.0183 (0.79)	0.0182 (0.78)	0.0263 (1.20)	
$Sec_t \geq S\&P_t$	0.0128*** (6.17)	0.0118*** (5.53)	0.0125*** (6.22)	0.0137*** (5.51)
$Fund_t \geq Sec_t$	0.0130*** (4.85)	0.0127*** (4.81)	0.00796** (3.07)	0.00768** (2.85)
$\log TNA$	-0.00837*** (-7.31)	-0.00847*** (-7.50)	-0.0351*** (-7.32)	-0.0369*** (-7.46)
Constant	0.0288*** (5.36)	0.0262*** (4.77)	0.128*** (7.39)	0.155*** (7.16)
Sector FE	No	Yes	No	No
Fund FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Month FE	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	62582	62582	62582	62582
Adjusted $R^2$	0.006	0.007	0.012	0.018

$t$  statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at fund level.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table XII: Impact of Risk Adjusted Outperformance on Fund Flows

Dependent variable: Fund flow, time  $t + 1$ . This table shows regressions of fractional fund flow at time  $t + 1$ , on an intercept, three risk-adjusted outperformance measures ( $\alpha$ ), first of a fund over its sector benchmark, then of the fund's sector benchmark over the S&P-500, and then four-factor alpha, as well as excess returns to the S&P 500 (S&P).  $\alpha$  is computed as the difference between realized excess returns in month  $t$  minus realized excess returns to a set of benchmarks the same month, each multiplied by its respective Beta. For *fund - sec* the subject returns are the returns to a fund, and benchmarks are the fund's sector benchmark and the S&P 500. For *sec - S&P* the subject returns are the returns to the fund's sector benchmark, and the benchmark is the S&P 500. For 4 factor  $\alpha$ , the subject returns are the returns to the fund, and the benchmark returns are the common asset pricing factors of excess market return, size, book-to-market, and momentum. The first column shows a pooled OLS estimate. In the second column, we add dummy variables for funds in each sector. We then show a regression with fund fixed effects, and lastly a regression with both fund- and time-period fixed effects. We use monthly data.

	Next Month Fund Flows			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\alpha(\text{fund} - \text{sec})_t$	0.329*** (4.07)	0.324*** (4.12)	0.249** (3.21)	0.319*** (3.82)
$\alpha(\text{sec} - \text{S\&P})_t$	0.157*** (4.41)	0.140*** (3.92)	0.0983** (2.77)	0.156*** (3.58)
4 factor $\alpha_t$	-0.0273 (-0.45)	-0.00457 (-0.08)	0.0652 (1.12)	-0.00981 (-0.14)
$(\text{S\&P} - \text{Risk-free})_t$	0.0120 (0.52)	0.0112 (0.49)	0.0115 (0.52)	
log TNA	-0.00830*** (-7.28)	-0.00831*** (-7.39)	-0.0351*** (-7.30)	-0.0363*** (-7.40)
Constant	0.0420*** (7.44)	0.0370*** (6.43)	0.140*** (7.90)	0.163*** (7.30)
Sector FE	No	Yes	No	No
Fund FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Month FE	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	62302	62302	62302	62302
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.007	0.012	0.018

$t$  statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at fund level.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$